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The merger of computer and communications technologies in the
past two decades has revolutionized information processing through-
out the world.' The most recent telecommunications advances make
possible direct international transfers of sensitive personal data via
* Former Information Policy Coordinator, Office of Health Research, Statistics, and Tech-
nology, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; A.B. (Computer and Communications
Sciences), 1973, University of Michigan; M.Sc. (Computer Science), 1977, University of Toronto;
J.D., 1982, National Law Center, George Washington University; presently associated with
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C.
1 See, for example, Computers in Communications. A Ratings Survey, DATAMATION, July
1981, at 100, for evidence of how extensive the merger of the two technologies has become. The
interdependence of the technologies has generated new application areas for both. The use of
computers has changed communications industries by vastly increasing the possible speed and
complexity of transmissions. Without the quantum leap into automated message transmissions
that computer technology made possible, the international flow of data would, at best, be limited
by the previous technological capabilities.
For the computer industry, as well, the marriage has been a welcome one. Not only have
many new markets been created by the automation of communications systems, but computer
technology itself has been spurred to new heights of speed and complexity in order to meet the
demands of message switching systems.
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computer-satellite links. 2 Computerized data bases containing com-
mercial information identifying citizens of one country are now rou-
tinely transferred to and stored in another, often without the
knowledge of the individuals identified in the data. Numerous Euro-
pean countries have enacted data protection legislation with the
avowed intent to protect their citizens from the improper use of per-
sonal information that is transferred extranationally.3 These data pro-
2 These advances are well beyond the stages of research and development, and have reached
the general public. Examples include proposals for direct satellite to home television transmis-
sion, and the phenomenal growth of satellite usage in communications companies such as Com-
sat and AT&T.
3 One of the salient characteristics of the transborder data flow issue is the rapidity with
which it has become a problem of major concern.
At the present time, the following national legislation has been enacted. Austria: Data Pro-
tection Act, No. 565, 1978 Bundesgesetzblatt ftur die Republik Osterreich [BGB1O] 3619 (Aus.),
reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 8 [hereinafter cited as Austrian Data Protec-
tion Act]. Canada: Canadian Human Rights Act, ch. 33, 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 887 (1977). Den-
mark: Private Registers etc. Act, No. 293, 1978 Lovtidende for Kongeriget Danmark [LKDk] A
833 (Den.), reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 6 [hereinafter cited as Danish
Private Registers Act]; Public Authorities' Registers Act, No. 294, 1978 LKDk A 839 (Den.),
reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 7 [hereinafter cited as Danish Public Regis-
ters Act]. France: Act 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Concerning Data Processing, Files, and Liberties,
1978 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] 227, 1978 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, glisla-
lion [D.S.L.] 77 (Fr.), reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 4 [hereinafter cited as
French Data Processing Act]; Act 78-22 of Jan. 10, 1978, Concerning Access by and Protection of
Consumers in the Area of Certain Credit Operations, 1978 J.O. 299, 1978 D.S.L. 84 (Fr.). Lux-
embourg: Law Governing the Use of Name-Linked Data in Data Processing, Document Parle-
mentaire No. 2131 (1979) (Lux.). New Zealand: Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, No. 29,
1976 N.Z. Stat. 168, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 9; Wanganui Computer
Centre Amendment Act 1977, No. 83, 1977 N.Z. Stat. 1091, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV.,
app. 9-5.2a, No. 10. Norway: Personal Data Registers Act, No. 48 (June 9, 1978) (Nor.), reprinted
in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 5 [hereinafter cited as Norwegian Privacy Act 1978].
Sweden: Data Act, No. 289, 1973 Svensk Fdrfattnings Samling [SFS] 518 (Swed.), as amendedby
Act of June 12, 1979, No. 334, 1979 SFS 727 (Swed.), reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-
5.2a, No. 2 [hereinafter cited as Swedish Data Act]. United States: Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), as amended by Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976);
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, §§ 1100-22, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 31 U.S.C.); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1976); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976); Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1202a, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1976). West
Germany: Federal Data Protection Act, 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt I 201 (W. Ger.), reprinted in 5
COMPUTER L. SERV., app. 9-5.2a, No. 3 [hereinafter cited as West German Data Protection Act].
Most of the above statutes have also been reprinted in EXPERT GROUP ON TRANSBORDER
DATA BARRIERS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY, WORKING PARTY ON INFORMATION, COM-
PUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
INDUSTRY, COMPILATION OF PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, No. I.C. 4
(DSTI/ICCP/79.1 1) (1979). For additional materials, including reports of national commissions




tection laws prohibit the export of such information under certain
specified conditions.
This perspective focuses on one of the more troublesome issues
surrounding national restrictions on international data flow: the emer-
gence of corporate privacy laws. In several data protection laws re-
cently enacted in Europe, restrictions have been imposed that limit the
transborder transfer not only of data identifying individuals, but of
data that identifies corporations as well. These particular statutes also
appear to give corporations the right to inspect other corporations'
data bases in which they are identified, like similar provisions in most
other data protection laws granting individuals the right of access to
records identifying them. To some degree, all data protection laws im-
pose a burden on multinational corporations and others who seek to
move data transnationally. 4 The laws containing corporate privacy
provisions, however, may have a particularly severe long term impact
on United States trade.5 Data protection laws containing only individ-
ual privacy provisions do not impose this extra burden. Thus, it is
important to examine and compare the burdens imposed by, and the
justifications offered for, the enactment of individual and corporate
privacy provisions in order to determine if the additional burden on
trade is warranted. Such an inquiry requires a delineation of the dif-
ferences between individual and corporate privacy interests from both
a legal and a policy perspective.
An examination of the individual and corporate privacy interests
through their differing common law development, statutory treatment,
and impact on international trade suggests that the primary rationale
underlying corporate privacy has little to do with privacy. Rather, the
rationale appears to be one of furthering the national economic devel-
opment of the country enacting the legislation. Moreover, the trade
barriers erected by corporate privacy provisions cannot be justified by
the same interests that rationalize individual privacy provisions. Cor-
porate privacy provisions, therefore, should not be included in data
protection laws. To avoid the international trade barriers generated by
corporate privacy provisions, nations'that have enacted or are consid-
ering the enactment of data protection laws must be persuaded to es-
4 Although multinationals are not the only parties affected by data protection laws, they are
the parties most acutely affected. See infra Section II.
5 The apocalyptic view expressed by Bank of America's Director of Telecommunications
Regulatory Policy, B.C. Burgess, that "if we can't move information, we go out of business" may
oversimplify the problem, but it serves to highlight the current serious concern of multinational
companies. Sanger, Multinationals WorryAs Countries Regulate Data Crossing Borders, Wall St.
J., Aug. 26, 1981, at I, col. 4.
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chew such provisions in their own laws. This important result can be
achieved by negotiating aggressively for international agreements that
encourage free trade. It may also be achieved by adopting a more
accommodating policy in the United States through enacting stronger
individual privacy protection than currently exists.
I. THE ECONOMIC STAKES
In order to understand the impact that foreign privacy laws have
on the United States, it is necessary to recognize the immense eco-
nomic stakes involved. As the world leader in information technology,
the United States exports more than twelve billion dollars per year in
computer and communications equipment alone.6 Data processing
services account for untold billions more in revenue. These exports
appear as computer systems and telecommunication services through-
out the world, forming the technological network which enables the
transborder flow of data in diverse situations. For example, a typical
export might involve computer terminals or other "peripheral equip-
ment" needed to link into an existing data base system (such as a credit
verification service), in which the central processing unit and principal
storage media remain in the United States. The transborder data flows
form the link between the remote equipment and central data storage.
In addition, exports might include data processing equipment
purchases by a foreign subsidiary of a multinational corporation, in
order to process and transmit data back to its parent corporation in the
United States.
The importance of developing sophisticated information technol-
ogy resources has been recognized by foreign governments. In Europe
and Japan, government-industry cooperation is viewed as a necessary
ingredient to eradicate American dominance in international informa-
tion markets and to alter the balance of economic power.7
6 International Data Flow: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Gov't Information and Individ-
ualRights of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 325 (1980) (statement of
Henry Geller, United States Department of Commerce). The computer-communications equip-
ment export market must be distinguished from the export of data processing and communica-
tions services, which gives rise to most of the problems addressed in this perspective. While sales
of equipment usually involve relocation of the equipment to the user's site, sales of data process-
ing and communications services, in contrast, usually involve the transmission of data from its
origin (or initial user) to some remote location. The advantages possessed by particular providers
of data processing services may stem from economies of scale, the complexities of the processing
involved, or other factors. See also HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, THIRTY-SECOND
REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1535 (1980).
7 For more details of actions taken by the Japanese and European governments to promote
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It is within this economic framework that transborder privacy is-
sues must be addressed, for it has become apparent that legislation
avowedly intended to protect personal privacy can be extremely effec-
tive in interfering with international commerce. These non-tariff trade
barriers can prohibitively increase the cost of doing business, inhibit
technological development, or even exclude foreign competition en-
tirely.' Although European data protection laws were passed with le-
gitimate concern for privacy protection, it must be recognized that
there are significant nationalistic motives behind much of the privacy
legislation as well.9 In response to these measures, the United States
must counter its vulnerability to non-tariff trade barriers'0 by seeking
an international agreement that, inter alia, distinguishes the privacy
interests of individuals from those of corporations.
The elimination of existing (and impending) corporate privacy
provisions in data protection laws would enhance free trade by elimi-
nating trade barriers that make protected domestic markets inaccessi-
ble to United States and other external competition. Such elimination
would not damage the privacy interests of individual citizens-the true
intended beneficiaries of such laws. In some circumstances, the re-
moval of corporate privacy provisions would benefit trade by reducing
private sector costs of complying with government regulation of data
practices. More important, in many instances the detrimental effects
their data processing industries, see Solomon & Grossman, Tax and Non-tax Policies to Promote
Capital Formatior" Stimulating High Technology in the 1980's, 1 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 63 (1982);
SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., HIGH
TECHNOLOGY AND JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY: A STRATEGY FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
(Comm. Print 1980); SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, THE MICROELECTRONIC CHAL-
LENGE 11-15 (1981); Durniak, U.S. Beachheadfor Japanese Computers is only the Start, ELEC-
TRONICS, Mar. 27, 1980, at 113; Gregory, Success in Innovation is the Main Problem Ahead, 106
FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Dec. 14, 1979, at 50; The Japanese Challenge, DUN'S REv., Aug. 1980,
at 80.
8 Government-industry cooperation is by no means limited to the various protectionist poli-
cies described in this paper. In Japan, the United States fiercest competitor, government assist-
ance to the semiconductor industry has been committed and extensive. The Japanese
government has altered the industry's debt-equity ratio by making extensive funds available at
favorable interest rates. The impetus to capital formation has been a major factor in the rapid
growth of the Japanese share of the world computer market. See SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, U.S. AND JAPANESE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES: A FINANCIAL COMPARISON
(1980).
9 See infra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
10 Access to information is often taken for granted in the United States. Senator George
McGovern recognized this vulnerability in 1977 when he remarked that an information-depen-
dent country such as the United States could be attacked by "cutting off contact between the
headquarters and the overseas branches of a multinational firm [by] taxing telecommunications
crossing borders [or by] building information walls" between nations. See McGovern, The Infor-
mationAge, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1977, § A, at 21, coL 2.
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of corporate privacy statutes may totally exclude United States firms
from certain markets. The elimination of these legal impediments
would reopen markets, and introduce the quality and cost advantages
that accompany increased competition.
The United States should advocate a position that both supports
appropriate individual privacy protection and minimizes the burden
on international trade. Such a position must meet two likely criticisms
from the nation's principal trading partners. First, some Europeans
are concerned that individual privacy is inadequately protected in the
United States. As discussed infra, in Section V, United States privacy
legislation, unlike its typical European counterpart, reflects a sector by
sector approach that leaves privacy protection to contractual resolution
by the parties involved. Where United States privacy protection laws
fail to cover part of the field-as is the case with individually identifi-
able medical records-the enactment of appropriate legislation would
respond to a pressing domestic need. Such laws could also encourage
continued international data flow by providing legal protection for for-
eign individuals identified in medical records data bases located in the
United States." Thus, one might envision a statute that addressed it-
self to all domestically stored medical records, not solely those involv-
ing United States citizens. Such a statute would provide any
individual with both the rights of access to and modification of records
identifying him or herself, and the necessary standing to seek a judicial
remedy if records were disclosed without consent. Although another
remedy might provide more effective protection for foreign citizens,
the provision of standing to sue in United States courts for private
judicial enforcement is consistent with existing privacy legislation that
seeks both to minimize direct government regulation and to encourage
uniform data handling practices throughout the United States with re-
spect to medical records. This approach would perhaps serve to as-
suage some European concerns.
Second, United States policymakers must take a stand in the cur-
rent international controversy over the legitimacy of corporate, as op-
posed to individual, privacy protection. The corporate privacy interest
is conceptually different from and inherently weaker than the individ-
ual privacy interest. As is discussed infra in Section III, the individual
privacy interest has a lengthy history, with firm roots in the United
States Constitution's orientation toward the protection of individual
rights. The enforcement of corporate privacy rights has no similar jus-
tifications. It is, as envisioned by its advocates, a vehicle for govern-
11 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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ment regulation of business. Corporate informational privacy
ultimately is an issue of commercial policy and should be addressed as
such.12 Evidence of the individual-corporate distinction also may be
seen in the grossly disparate consequences of enforcing the two types
of provisions. Enforcement of individual privacy rights has a substan-
tial impact on how a company does business by preventing its use of
specified information outside the country. The corporate privacy
right, however, with its attendant spectre of providing competing cor-
porations (or the government) with access to data bases that identify
competitors, presents problems of a much greater magnitude. Free
trade itself is threatened by the statutory creation of a corporate pri-
vacy right.
A notable, if small, step toward international accord has been
taken with respect to individual privacy through a recent agreement
reached by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development on guidelines for individual privacy.'3 Ultimately,
however, the regulation of international data flow is an issue of eco-
nomic and commercial policy. Within that context, the clarification of
what are legitimate privacy interests, and what are not, will help clar-
ify the larger debate over what is essentially a question of world
commerce.
II. TYPES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS
An examination of individual and corporate privacy interests
must commence with the observation that restrictions on data transfers
in the private sector differ significantly from restrictions on transfers
involving government records. Public sector data flows are qualita-
tively different from private sector data flows because, in the public
12 Confusion often arises over conflicting uses of the terms "privacy," "confidentiality," and
"security." The working definitions used here have been adopted by the Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations. Privacy is defined as a social issue involving questions of what
data should be collected and stored, and to whom they should be released. Individual privacy
and personal privacy are used synonymously to refer to these questions as they apply to natural
persons, as opposed to corporate privacy, which refers to juristic persons, including associations,
institutions, and corporations. Confidentiality, on the other hand, is a subset of the privacy issues
concerning the protection of information from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruc-
tion. Data security describes procedural measures taken to assure confidentiality. See Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. (ADAPSO), [U.S.] Guidelines on Security,
quotedin Marks, A Perspective on Information Policy, Privacy and Transborder Dataftow Restric-
tions, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 7-5, art. 2, at 11 (1979). Questions of privacy and security can
apply to manual as well as automated systems. See Noll, The Interactions of Computers and
Privacy, 7 HONEYWELL COMPUTER J. 163, 165 (1973).
13 For a more detailed discussion of the OECD Guidelines, see infra notes 104-114 and ac-
companying text.
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sector, the government itself possesses the identifying data. A govern-
ment is presumably capable of negotiating adequate protection for its
citizens before it makes any data transfers to an entity outside of its
jurisdiction. Thus, differences between the sectors call for separate
legislative approaches.
In the public sector, transborder data flow may be initiated by
either national governments or interhational agencies. When govern-
ments or agencies exchange data under bilateral agreements or multi-
lateral treaties, the purpose of the transfer is usually to obtain
information unavailable domestically for its own administrative and
regulatory purposes. For example, the United States Food and Drug
Administration and the Centers for Disease Control exchange with
their foreign counterparts health data identifying manufacturers and
institutions. 4 International data transfers for purposes of law enforce-
ment, social welfare, and commercial regulation are also common-
place.' 5 Although no two national data systems have yet been linked
for direct automated transmissions, the reasons for this are political
rather than technical.'6 Before such automated transfers can be initi-
ated, the governments involved must resolve questions of disclosure
and unauthorized use of the transferred data. Thus, regulatory diffi-
culties are less likely to occur in the public sector than in the private
sector. The parties controlling the data are national governments,
which can presumably protect the interests of their own citizens in
such transactions.
17
14 Ironically, the United States Congress may have made exchanges of this type potentially
injurious to information confidentiality. Under the Freedom of Information Act, information
exchanges between the United States and foreign governments which do not involve national
security matters are subject to public release upon request.
15 Pipe, Work Paper on Transborder Information Flows: Requirementsfor a New International
Framework, 9 LAW & COMPUTER TECH. 17, 21 (1976).
16 The technical problems have been solved for the most part as witnessed by already extant
corporate and governmental systems. See infra text accompanying notes 18 and 21.
17 It is in the realm of intergovernmental exchanges of data that a contractual approach
would provide the most feasible way to protect citizens' interests. To the extent that the "consid-
eration" in such exchanges-personally identifiable data-would be mutual, sufficient disincen-
tives to breaching the agreement would exist on both sides. See Note, Contractsfor Transnational
Information Services: Securing Equivalency of Data Protection, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157, 162
(1981).
One obstacle that must be overcome, however, is the problem that might occur if one of the
countries has domestic legislation that is inconsistent with the receipt of foreign data. For exam-
ple, the Freedom of Information Act may require the release of foreign data received by a United
States government agency from a foreign government, even if a promise of nondisclosure was
made by the agency, except where the data falls under one of the Act's exemptions. 5 U.S.C.




Most intergovernmental data sharing occurs under the auspices of
United Nations affiliated agencies. These agencies collect personally
and institutionally identifiable data under agreements with various
participating nations. Interpol, for example, collects, processes, and
discloses to its members extensive data that identify individuals sus-
pected of criminal activity. 8 The World Health Organization also
gathers data in confidence from member countries identifying the
manufacturers of drugs and medical devices. When conflicts of law
arise from inconsistent national data protection laws, they tend to have
little impact on international agencies because the agencies are not
subject to the domestic laws of their host countries.' 9 Generally, there-
fore, public sector transborder data flows are removed from the arena
of trade policy questions. Such is not the case with respect to private
sector transborder data flows.
Private sector transborder data flows present extensive and prob-
lematic privacy questions. Multinational corporations in the commu-
nications, banking, credit, insurance, tourism, entertainment, and
employment services industries are extensively involved in interna-
tional trade, and such trade requires these corporations to transfer in-
formation from country to country.20 Additionally, domestic
corporations transacting business with foreign concerns regularly
transmit sales information back to their home countries. In either
case, the rewards of commercial efficiency, and, ultimately, commer-
cial viability itself, depend upon centralization in one country of all
business-related data, including data identifying foreign individuals
and corporations.
Commercial data transferred across national borders can be clas-
sified into two categories. The first category consists of information
identifying individual persons. It is typified by a commercial transac-
tion in which a client has business dealings with a foreign enterprise or
subsidiary domiciled in his or her own country. Swissair, for example,
18 F. HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE 260 (1975).
19 The unique legal position of international agencies necessitates rather unique operational
restrictions. Typically, any limits that are to be imposed on their data processing activities must
be written into the agency charter. Presumably, data processing contractors with an international
agency would be subject to the domestic data protection laws in their host country.
20 Of course, international trade itself is hardly a recent phenomenon. However, the modern-
day multinational corporation has required, as an essential part of its infrastructure, access to
information about its business operations in many countries. Automated management informa-
tion systems can help to process the immense amount of data needed to operate any large busi-
ness. Whether the data are stored in one central location at corporate headquarters or elsewhere
as part of a network system, they will cross national borders at some time. See Pipe, supra note
15, at 21.
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like many other corporations, maintains its headquarters and central
computer facility in one city (Zurich), but has on-line terminals in
many major cities throughout the world which are linked to its head-
quarters.21 Commercial transaction data transmitted to a central com-
puter invariably includes information identifying individual persons.
Transborder data flows will also occur when the internal records of a
multinational corporation are collected and processed at a central lo-
cation outside the country in which the data were collected. Intracor-
porate information stored internationally usually includes employee
records (such as medical and payroll files), client records (such as
mailing lists), and other information identifying individuals. Although
employees usually are granted access to their own records, they have
neither the legal right of access nor the right to prevent release by their
employer once the data have been removed to another country.z
The second category of commercial data consists of intracorporate
records containing information identifying other corporations. This
information may include details of competitors' products or sales,
whether collected for business planning purposes or for potential liti-
gation. Individuals are not identified but the competing corporations
are named. It is this category that is covered by the corporate privacy
provisions of data transfer laws. Although confidential commercial in-
formation identifying competitors, including clients, sales, and other
economic indicators, is unquestionably valuable to its owner, it is fun-
damentally different from sensitive employee medical records because
its impact is purely business related. Naturally, if the intracorporate
records do not identify individuals or corporations, privacy questions
do not arise.23 However, technical problems24 such as data security
21 F. HONDIUS, supra note 18, at 246.
An "on-line" system is one that provides processing while a user waits for the response. For
example, an airline reservation system that can generate information regarding current seat avail-
ability on a flight is on-line, while a biweekly payroll run is not.
The significance of on-line systems is that the transborder data flow must occur instantane-
ously as part of the transaction involved. Any inspection of the data leaving a country must be
automated, if it is not totally to destroy the utility of the on-line system.
22 The situation could be complicated even further if access to the employee records were
sought legitimately by the employer's government. In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980), United States government access to employee medical records was
permitted by the court for epidemiological research. While a corporation might attempt foreign
storage of the medical records in order to prevent access by the employee's government, the
corporation would be unable to prevent access by the government of the foreign country where
the records are being stored, conceivably producing a politically untenable solution.
23 In practice, any attempt to distinguish comprehensively between corporate and individu-
ally identifiable data being transmitted out of a country creates insurmountable administrative
problems. One approach that might be taken would be to create an overseeing agency. The
administrative agency could delegate responsibility for compliance respecting all data transfers
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will remain a primary concern where the information constitutes intel-
lectual property,2 5 even if individuals or competitor corporations are
not identified therein. 6
Private sector transborder data flows may also include informa-
tion intended for non-commercial use. International labor, profes-
sional, and religious associations have networks for
intraorganizational data transfers, which may create problems similar
to those of commercial data transfers. Examples include release of
mailing lists without the consent of members or membership lists
which themselves denote religious or political affiliation. Individual
privacy concerns regarding non-commercial data are similar to those
for commercial data. The only significant distinction is that individual
affiliation is usually completely voluntary, thus affording the individ-
made. If data inspection were performed manually, the agency could at best expect to examine
templates identifying the types of data involved or else sample a very small portion of the data
being transmitted. From a technical perspective, a single portal for all data entering and leaving
the country might afford the power totally to terminate the data exchanges of a company; how-
ever, as compared to more traditional means of enforcement, such as an injunction, such a meas-
ure would be exorbitant in cost, and onerous to the parties affected.
24 Technical considerations revolve basically around three areas: data security, data quality,
and auditing/compliance. In the area of data security, significant advances have been made.
Technology now exists for, inter alia, backup storage of data, alternate communications links,
secure software, user identification, and data encryption.
The maintenance of data quality has also advanced as the state of the art in data base system
design has become more sophisticated. Measures to protect data quality include controls over
who may alter data, restrictions on the types of data retained, and requirements that data be
timely.
With respect to auditing and compliance, as noted supra in note 23, automated solutions
may prove to be technically infeasible. The use of formal software verification computer pro-
grams as a means of ensuring compliance is still in its infancy and is not yet capable of proving
the correctness of any but very small systems. In addition, "shadow systems" that are designed to
mislead auditors and circumvent legal requirements are, at present, very difficult to unearth.
For further information on technical problems, see Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in
Transnational Data Processing Systems, 16 STAN. INT'L L. J. 67, 80 (1980); Turn, Technical As-
pects of Privacy Protection, Proc., 78 COMPSAC 229 (1978).
25 Issues arising out of the automated text processing capabilities will create problems un-
dreamed of a decade ago with respect to intellectual property stored in computers. De Sola Pool
& Solomon have argued, correctly, that current legal concepts of copyright will create more
problems than they will solve when applied to computer communications. De Sola Pool & Solo-
mon, Intellectual Property and Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. INT'L L.J. 113 (1980).
The above authors also suggest that copyright law and regulation do not present a practical
solution to transborder data flow conflicts. In arguing that traditional legal approaches could be
better adapted than copyright law to cope with these problems, de Sola Pool & Solomon suggest
that solutions based on practice in the 1970s will be irrelevant in the 1980s. Id.
26 Where the intellectual property is a patent or copyright that has been validly issued by
numerous countries (as is common practice today), a security breach may cause no subsequent
damage. However, if trade secrets (which may include commercial lists or even computer
software) are obtained through a breach of security, the ensuing competitive damage may be
irreparable.
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ual an option to terminate his affiliation with the organization in-
volved. Commercial credit and employment relationships, however,
do not offer the individual similar leverage.
III. FOUNDATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE PRIVACY
INTERESTS
In the debate over the enactment of data protection legislation,
advocates of protectionist non-tariff trade barriers have overlooked the
differences between corporate and individual privacy interests. 27 This
oversight has placed an unmerited veil of legitimacy around attempts
in some nations to add corporate privacy provisions to existing indi-
vidual-oriented data protection laws in an effort to foreclose competi-
tion from United States multinational corporations by blocking
information flow.
The privacy interest of individuals should be seen as fundamen-
tal, deriving its importance from the societal norms we call human
rights. In contrast, the establishment of a corporate privacy interest
arises out of decisions about economic policy. No true "privacy" in-
terests are at issue here. Thus, the rationale for protecting corporate
privacy is distinctly different from the rationale for protecting the pri-
vacy rights of individuals. In light of the significant burden on inter-
national commerce that accompanies corporate privacy legislation,
these differing rationales must be closely examined to determine if the
burden is justified.
To discern the difference between the corporate privacy interest
and the individual privacy interest, the following three assertions must
be examined. First, historically, the two interests have been treated
differently in both the common law and statutory law. Second, the
rationale for corporate privacy rests upon a wholly separate founda-
tion from that of individual privacy. Third, an inspection of the two
respective classes (individuals and corporations) reveals that corpora-
27 One example of this confusion occurred in 1971, when the International Association of
Lawyers submitted several draft resolutions on privacy in transborder data flows to the Council
of Europe, each proposing substantially equivalent privacy protection for individuals and for
businesses (Draft Articles for an International Convention for the Protection of Personal and
Industrial Privacy; International Agreement for the Protection of the Personal and Industrial
Spheres). The failure of the proposals to identify the unique characteristics of corporate privacy
generated misunderstanding regarding the two interests. The proposals' attempt to remold the
traditional subjective right of privacy into an objective privacy area failed because it oversimpli-
fied the issues. However, the "objectivized privacy area" concept took root, and evolved into the
present day concept of data protection, that is, the regulation of data handling practices in order
to protect ultimately the privacy of individuals. See F. HONDIUS, supra note 18, at 96-97.
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tions have an entirely different reason for seeking access to data bases
that identify them than do individuals.
The common law foundations of individual privacy in the United
States are fairly recent. For both social and technological reasons, in-
dividual privacy was of little significance in early America. Before the
advent of mass media and telecommunications, personally identifiable
information was rarely available from sources other than those close to
the individual. In small towns and rural areas, a person invariably
knew who possessed personal information about him or her. The
source of the data, therefore, was usually immediately known, or if
not, then easily traceable.28
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis proposed the recog-
nition of a common law tort action for invasion of privacy.29 In time,
the common law came to recognize privacy interests against appropri-
ation of personal data, intrusion on personal affairs, public disclosure
of private information, and defamation.30 The common law, however,
never provided sufficient protection against the abuse (as opposed to
the appropriation) of personal data, allowing damages only where eco-
nomic loss could be proven.3'
In comparison, the United States Constitution delineates the pri-
vacy interests of individuals only indirectly. Most relevant to data
processing are the right to associational privacy,32 the right to possess
beliefs free from governmental intrusion,33 and the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.34 Although the protection of
these interests does not provide adequate personal protection against
data abuse, it does impose general limits on government use of data.
35
28 For further discussion, see A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY, ch. 5 (1971).
29 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
30 The common law right to privacy is described in detail in A. MILLER, supra note 28, ch. 5.
31 That damages would be limited to economic loss from misuse of data is not surprising.
Prior to the advent of automated data processing, the manual processing of data was so cumber-
some that it was difficult to even conceive of a data processing service industry, much less the
possibility of extensive data theft.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I, construed in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognition
of right to be protected against state compulsion to disclose affiliation with the NAACP).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I, construed in Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968) (a screening
program for American merchant vessels was held unconstitutional where questions were asked
that impinged upon first amendment freedoms but were concerned with appellant's beliefs, not
his conduct).
34 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, construed in Katz v. United States, 380 U.S. 347 (1967) (tapping
telephone conversation while petitioner used telephone booth was an illegal search and seizure
violating petitioner's right to privacy).
35 The Supreme Court at least recognized the threat of possible abuse from automated data
processing in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977), where a state planned to create a data
base containing information identifying all users of prescription drugs. The dictum in the case
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An expansion of statutory privacy protection from the original
common law and constitutional bases has occurred in recognition of
the fact that, as the Privacy Protection Study Commission noted, "in
America today, records mediate relationships between individuals and
organizations."36 Unlike nineteenth century America, current disclo-
sures of confidential information cannot be easily traced back to those
few people in the community (banker, doctor, lawyer, etc.) that hold
such information. Today, a data processing manager who indiscrimi-
nately releases personal data will not be held legally accountable to the
victim of the abuse absent a statutory remedy. Even the existence of
such a remedy, however, if limited to domestic abuses, would be of
little avail when the data are already stored in a foreign jurisdiction.37
The rationale for individual privacy protection rests upon the so-
cietal values of dignity and uniqueness of the individual-i.e., human
rights. As computer technology has diffused, it has become cost-effi-
cient to create massive registries containing information about individ-
uals. Thus, individuals seeking to prevent abuses of computerized
information identifying them must first locate the data bases where
they are personally identified. This concern was articulated in the
1973 report of the United States Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Sys-
tems.3" The HEW rep6 rt outlined five basic components of the right
of individual data privacy:
1. No secret systems should exist.
2. An individual should be guaranteed access to examine records iden-
tifying him or her.
3. Personally identifiable data should be used only for the purposes for
which they were collected.
4. An individual should be ensured the right to correct inaccurate per-
sonal data.
5. Organizations should take measures to ensure the accuracy and se-
curity of personal data controlled by them.
39
suggests that without any safeguards on disclosure, the constitutional right to privacy might have
been violated.
36 PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SO-
CIETY 3 (1977).
37 Once the data have been removed from the country, the foreign jurisdiction may afford no
legal remedy to a foreign citizen seeking relief. Furthermore, additional duplication of the data
may have already occurred in the interim with removal to other jurisdictions.
38 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 4
(1973).
39 Id. These principles later became a cornerstone of the Privacy Act of 1974. The annual




Although the individual privacy interest rests upon human rights,
the human rights rationale also requires that privacy protection not be
overbroad.40 Overbroad data protection laws encroach upon freedom
of expression.4" Data protection laws that restrict removal of individu-
ally identifiable data from a country are especially vulnerable to this
criticism. For example, data export restrictions on the transfer of non-
sensitive portions of intracorporate employee records and the transfer
of personal data with the express consent of the data subject would be
an unjustifiable protection of individual privacy.42
Furthermore, data protection laws that limit data flow may block
access to scientific and technical expertise. In developing countries, for
example, data transfer restrictions erected to stimulate the domestic
computer-communications industry by preventing data from leaving
the country may backfire by denying domestic businesses access to
state-of-the-art techniques. In this complex situation, many develop-
ing countries may feel that they must make a Hobson's choice between
blocked technological progress and continued economic dependence.
This dilemma presents an excellent opportunity for the United States
to improve relations with these nations by cooperating in the search
for compatibility between individual privacy protection and competi-
tive free trade.
A final rationale supporting the existence of the individual pri-
vacy interest becomes apparent from an enumeration of the harms that
individual privacy provisions are designed to eliminate. Absent such
provisions, individuals may suffer personal indignities, unwarranted
deprivation of the rights and privileges of citizenship, unfair denials of
credit, or even incarceration because they are unable to assess and to
correct inaccurate data identifying them. Moreover, an individual
needs the protections provided by privacy statutes because of the indi-
vidual's relative lack of bargaining power against the large institutions
controlling the data that identify him or her.
Unlike the individual privacy interest that has evolved historically
through common law and constitutional interpretations, the corporate
privacy interest has little precedent to support it. Until the recent
40 The opposing conclusion was reached regarding human rights issues in Gotlieb, Dalfen &
Katz, The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues
and Approaches to Guiding Princoles, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 257 (1974), reprinted in 5 CoM-
PUTER L. SERV. § 9-7.5, art. 1, at 32.
41 For a more detailed discussion of the balance between freedom of expression and the right
to privacy, see A. MILLER, supra note 28, at 205-06.
42 One illustration of nonsensitive portions of an employee record might include work loca-
tions, managers' names, and technical skills available to the corporation.
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emergence of several European statutes with corporate privacy provi-
sions, such an interest had not been recognized.
It should be noted that narrowly construed constitutional grounds
do exist to support an extremely limited corporate privacy interest. In
the United States, first amendment rights of expression have been up-
held for corporations, although the scope of the protection is narrower
than that for individual freedom of speech.4 3 Constitutional and legal
traditions in Germany and Austria also encompass juristic persons;
nevertheless, the constitutional bases there for corporate privacy are
much narrower than for the individual privacy interest. It has been
suggested that a broad constitutional basis for corporate privacy
should exist as a means for protecting individual privacy.' However,
individual privacy-as evidenced by the vast majority of extant laws-
is best protected by statutes sensitive to the adverse impact directly felt
by the individuals affected. In any case, such an argument does not
address the treatment of data that identify competing institutions,
rather than individuals.
The extension of privacy rights in the data protection arena to
include juristic persons ostensibly protects a corporation by preventing
competing corporations from abusing information in their data base
that identifies it. Yet, an examination of the impact of this protection
on most corporations and other institutions reveals that corporate pri-
vacy laws hardly would be desirable. To extend principles of individ-
ual privacy to the corporate sphere by enforcing a right of access
among corporations holding commercial information about each other
could damage competition. One commentator, noting the recent pas-
sage of such a provision in Norway,45 observed that:
[Corporations] will be required to register and/or license all data bases
they maintain regarding each other, to allow other entities, even competi-
tors, to inspect, challenge, and demand corrections or deletions of data;
and to grant other companies the right to limit dissemination and/or use
of data regarding them unless notification has been given. Furthermore,
the transborder data flow of information relating to entities themselves
will be subject to the same potential restrictions that can be applied to
personal data on individuals. The potential impact on marketing, prod-
uct development, and pricing, and on competition in general is
43 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (expression of corporation's views
were constitutionally protected even where it could not be proved that the issues materially af-
fected the corporation's business).
44 F. HONDIUS, supra note 18, at 100.




As stated above, an individual benefits from access rights to inspect
and correct data bases containing personally identifiable information
about him or her. If, however, the information identifies a corporation
instead of an individual, it will not benefit that corporation to grant it
access rights similar to those granted to an individual. With respect to
corporate privacy, the protection of human rights is not at issue.
Rather, the interests and the consequences are purely economic. Re-
ciprocal rights of access would be highly anti-competitive since
whatever competitive advantage a corporation gained from obtaining
access to its competitors' records regarding itself would be more than
offset by forced disclosures from its own records.
In contrast, corporate privacy protection from indiscriminate ac-
cess and public disclosure by the government may be desirable. For
example, American hospitals that request assistance from the Centers
for Disease Control do not want their identity disclosed.47 Many vol-
untary disclosures to governments may be made available only when
an institution is promised confidentiality in return. The National
Center for Health Statistics, for example, has legislative authority to
promise that the names of institutions obtained in its surveys will not
be released without the consent of the identified institution.48 More
generally, the Trade Secrets Act provides that no federal employee
may disclose any confidential commercial information that has been
collected by the federal government unless specifically authorized by
law.
49
However, a policy that protects data which have been confiden-
tially disclosed to further a government purpose needs less justification
than a policy that restricts intra-corporate transmission of data that
46 McGuire, The Information Age: An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 5-6 (1979).
47 An analogous, but unrelated situation has arisen under the rubric of inverse Freedom of
Information suits. In such cases, a corporation may challenge the intended release of data by the
government as a result of some third party's Freedom of Information Act request. See Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976);
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 242m(d) (1976); see infira note 65 for text of statute.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). Section 1905, in pertinent part, provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not
authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment...
which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of
work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or asso-
ciation; ... shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
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have been privately generated for competitive business purposes. The
recent corporate privacy provisions adopted in Norway not only au-
thorize government licensing and inspection of data, but seemingly im-
pose the same export restrictions that are imposed on data identifying
individuals. The true beneficiaries of such a statute would be the do-
mestic industries and national governments seeking to impede the
business of multinationals in their countries. Essentially, then, corpo-
rate privacy in the data protection arena is no more and no less than a
vehicle for erecting protectionist commercial policies.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED FOR NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS
Governments that impose privacy laws which act as non-tariff
trade barriers offer a variety of justifications for their policies. Devel-
oping countries often cite American cultural dominance and a lack of
independence from the United States economy as reasons for attempt-
ing to limit the influx of American products and services. In devel-
oped countries, an additional factor is present. These countries realize
that their economic success in the next half century depends upon
wresting the markets for data processing and services away from the
grip of American businesses. These rationales do not justify the pro-
tection of privacyper se for either individuals or corporations. Rather,
they are commercial reasons for fostering national economic develop-
ment, which is the primary motivation behind corporate privacy laws.
Protectionist justifications have also been offered to buttress human
rights rationale for individual privacy protection.
Nations yet to enact individual privacy legislation,50 in particular
the developing countries, may desire to retain control over domestic
data and data processing. The importation of data processing services
and consequent exportation of data may be seen by these countries as
an intrusive United States presence, capable of imposing alien stan-
dards on them. Developing nations are concerned that persons mak-
ing administrative business decisions from the United States based on
foreign-source data may not be aware that they are imposing a cultural
bias on the countries affected by their decisions. For example, the cri-
teria used for granting and revoking credit may differ widely between
a developing country and the developed country where the credit deci-
sions are made. But since the decision is made at the corporate head-
quarters in the developed country where the data base is maintained,
50 A complete list of all nations that have enacted privacy or data protection legislation is
included supra in note 3. Others are presumed not to have acted although discussions are cur-
rently ongoing in many nations.
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its standards form the basis for credit decisions in the developing
country.
Even when the two countries have much in common, as do Ca-
nada and the United States, information technology has a cultural im-
pact.51 Many standardized aptitude tests, for example, are developed
and graded in the United States. When the tests are administered in
Canada, they impose a bias against Canadian students by assuming
detailed knowledge of United States history and culture.52 Between
the United States and a Third World country the contrast is even
sharper.
The problems faced by a country which is information poor coun-
try relative to the United States are not unlike those faced by a "one-
crop" nation. As long as remote data processing services cost less than
the same services procured domestically, the developing country re-
mains technologically underdeveloped, waiting for its domestic market
in data processing products and services to evolve. Meanwhile, its own
data processing industry fails to develop because there is little demand
for domestic data processing products. The technological disparity is
so complete that data processing users in developing countries often
find it less expensive to contract for data processing services that use
satellite technology to communicate thousands of miles back to the
United States than to procure, implement, and maintain their own sys-
tems.53 The continual export of raw data for processing elsewhere
may ultimately, stunt other domestic industries that owe their growth
to data processing. Demand for data processing personnel may subse-
quently stall and the ancillary growth in support industries exper-
ienced in the developed countries may only materialize slowly.
54
Many developed nations, albeit for different reasons, also are de-
fensive of United States dominance in data processing and services. In
western Europe and Japan, it has become axiomatic that information
51 Science and technology may undermine religious teachings and social mores. An interest-
ing portrayal of these effects is described in Bowler, Will Science and Technology Bring Conflict
Within Third World Countries?, 57 SCIENCE FoRUM 12 (1977).
52 Gotlieb & Katz, Work Paper on Issues Associated with the Transborder Flow of Personal
Information, 9 LAW & COMPUrER TECH. 3, 12 (1976).
53 Privacy legislation that restricts data flow out of the country can assist the domestic data
processing industry as effectively as import tariffs do. Tariffs operate by altering the relative
prices of domestic and foreign products and services in favor of domestic industry. Data export
legislation is less subtle: domestic goods and services are favored because dealing with foreign
companies is, in essence, declared malumprohibitum.
54 For more information on the rapid growth of the industry and a general introduction, see
McGuire, supra note 46.
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control is the key to political and economic security." Regardless of
how information-rich a country may be, its sovereignty is endangered
to the extent that its information resources are controlled extra-juris-
dictionally. For example, the data processing service used by the Fire
Department of Malmo, Sweden, stores architectural firefighting infor-
mation in a data base located in Cleveland, Ohio. 6 Consider the po-
tential hazard should technical problems or even a hostile act in the
host country lead to a communications failure. The difficulties are suf-
ficient to give pause even when personally identifiable data are not
involved.
This is not to suggest that isolationism is preferable to interdepen-
dence. Rather, it is simply to note that interdependence has a cost
which is more keenly felt by the other developed nations than by the
United States. The cost is minimal, however, when compared with the
economic gains possible through unrestricted international trade. Cor-
porate privacy laws that restrict trade are strategems in pursuit of iso-
lationist national economic growth and not in defense of a justifiable
interest in privacy.
V. RECENT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The recent evolution of privacy protection laws in Europe and the
United States reflects markedly different philosophies between nations.
In the United States, legislation has generally focused on provisions
for self-enforcement through the American judiciary. 7 In contrast,
most European countries have imposed direct statutory limits on data
handling by regulating private sector practices. The different ap-
proaches not only reflect varying views of the appropriate role of gov-
ernment, but have also made uniformity of privacy protection more
difficult to achieve.
European data protection laws typically create a governmental
commission with specified executive and judicial powers to regulate
domestic data practices. The Swedish Data Bank Statute58 was the
55 See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 10.
56 Burnham, United States is Worried by World Efforts to Curtail Flow of Inforration, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3. The example demonstrates the extent of international
interdependence, and just how essential foreign stored data bases may be to domestic stability,
whether or not they contain data identifying individuals.
57 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
58 Swedish Data Act, supra note 3. Many of the statutes cited in this paper have also been
reprinted in OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SELECTED FOREIGN
NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION LAWS AND BILLS (1978). Portions of the Swedish act reprinted in
the following footnotes are representative of the language used in most of the European laws. As
noted in the text, the provisions of the laws are very similar.
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first of these laws to regulate automated transborder data transfers. Its
avowed legislative intent was to assure Swedish citizens that computer-
ized data would be used only for the purposes for which they were
collected. The act created the Swedish Data Inspection Board, a gov-
ernment agency with strong regulatory powers. The Swedish act re-
quires the Data Inspection Board to discriminate among different
types of data. The Board can deny permission to create any system of
personal records by refusing to grant the necessary license.5 9 The deci-
sion whether or not a license issues is based upon the kind and quanti-
ty of information to be collected.60 For example, only under
extraordinary circumstances will the Board grant a license to a private
party seeking to collect or disclose data relating to health, religion, or
other associational affiliations.6 Furthermore, the statute gives indi-
viduals the right to locate, examine, and correct any records containing
information concerning them.62
59 Swedish Data Act, supra note 3, § 2. Section 2 states:
A personal register may not be started or kept without permission by the Data Inspection
Board.
The first paragraph of this section does not apply to personal registers established ac-
cording to a decision by King or Parliament. Before such a decision is taken the Data In-
spection Board shall be heard.
60 Id. § 3. Section 3 states:
The Data Inspection Board shall grant permission to start and keep a personal register, if
there is no reason to assume that, with due observance of the regulations laid down pursuant
to sections 5 and 6, undue encroachment on the privacy of individuals will arise.
At the appraisal whether undue encroachment may arise special attention should be
given to the kind and quantity of personal information meant to be included in the register
and to the attitude towards the register shown or expected from the individuals meant to be
registered.
61 Id. § 4. Section 4 states, in pertinent part:
Permission to start and keep a personal register containing information that anyone is sus-
pected of or convicted for a crime or has been subjected to coercive action. . . may not be
granted ... unless there are extraordinary reasons for this.
Permission to start and keep a personal register otherwise containing information about
anybody's illness or state of health or information that anybody has received social assist-
ance, treatment for alcoholism or the like, or has been the subject of proceedings under the
Child Welfare Act or the Foreigners Act, may not be granted to a person other than an
authority which is by law or statute responsible for keeping a record of such information,
unless there are special reasons for this.
Permission to start and keep a personal register containing information about anybody's
political or religious views may be granted only where there are special reasons. This shall
not, however, apply to a personal register that an association wants to keep of its own
members.
62 Id. §§ 8, 10, 22. Section 8 states, in pertinent part:
If there is reason to suspect that personal information in a personal register is incorrect, the
responsible keeper of the register shall, without delay, take the necessary steps to ascertain
the correctness of the information and, if needed, to correct it or exclude it from the register.
If a piece of information, that is corrected or excluded, has been handed over to a per-
son other than the individual registered, the responsible keeper of the register shall, at the
request of the individual registered, notify the receiver concerning the correction or the ex-
clusion. . ..
Section 10 states, in pertinent part:
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The German Data Act,6 3 passed in 1977, is similar to its Swedish
counterpart. It, too, creates a central authority with licensing power
over all private and public data bases. Personal data from secondary
(i.e., indirect) sources are subject to the same strict requirements that
encompass primary data. The remedies prescribed by the Swedish,
German, and most other European data protection laws involve both
administrative and judicial enforcement through data inspection
boards. Fines and imprisonment may be imposed to enforce rights of
access and correction. The boards then act in a judicial capacity when
hearing administrative appeals. Anyone illegally procuring access to,
changing, or deleting records is subject to prosecution for "data tres-
pass."64 In addition to statutory criminal enforcement provisions,
Sweden has created a private cause of action to protect data from
abuse.65 This private cause of action differs from common law privacy
actions in the United States because the scope of data encompassed
under the Swedish law is much greater. Furthermore, in Sweden the
private cause of action is an alternative to enforcement by the Data
Inspection Board. In the United States, however, the private cause of
action is the sole avenue for relief.
More important from the standpoint of international trade, these
European data protection laws exert control over information flowing
out of the country. The controls may apply to data identifying indi-
viduals or may limit removal of data identifying any juristic person,
that is, corporations and institutions as well. The legislation of three
European countries regarding only individuals will illustrate.
At the request of an individual registered the responsible keeper of the register shall as soon
as possible inform him of the personal information concerning him in the register. When an
individual registered has been thus informed, new information need not be given to him
until twelve months later.
Information according to the first paragraph of this section shall be given free of charge
to the individual ....
Section 12 states:
Should a responsible keeper of a register cease to keep a personal register the Data Inspec-
tion Board must be notified. The Data Inspection Board shall prescribe how the register
should be dealt with.
63 West German Data Protection Act, supra note 3.
64 Swedish Data Act, supra note 3, § 21. Section 21 of the Swedish act provides that:
Any person who, without authorization, effects access to recordings for ADP or unduly alters
or obliterates such information or includes it in a register will be sentenced for data trespass
to pay a fine or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, if the perpetration is not
punishable by the Penal Code. ...
Section I of the German act states that the purpose of the statute is to "ensure against the
misuse of personal data during storage, communication, modification, and erasure (data process-
ing) and thereby to prevent harm to any personal interests that warrant protection." West Ger-
man Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 1.
65 Swedish Data Act, supra note 3, § 21. For relevant text, see supra note 64.
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Sweden is a typical example. The Swedish Data Inspection Board
is authorized to forbid any removal of data from the country if it con-
cludes that the recipient nation's privacy safeguards are inadequate.66
In one incident prior to passage of a similar privacy act in Germany,
the Swedish Data Inspection Board denied permission to Siemens, a
German based corporation, to consolidate its Swedish employee
records with the remainder of its employee files in Germany.67 In an-
other instance, a Swedish county government was denied permission
to transfer a list of its county residents to a British firm for data
processing because the Swedish Data Inspection Board perceived gaps
in British privacy protection.68 Since its enactment, application of the
Swedish law suggests that information control itself is as important a
by-product of the Swedish Data Act as is the protection of privacy.
69
In both instances above, only individually identifiable data were
being transferred. Thus, the corporation and government entity in-
volved were adversely affected because of restrictions on individually
identifiable data, and not because of restrictions on data identifying
other corporations. The Swedish statute does not include a corporate
privacy provision. The burdens on trade created by restrictions on in-
dividual data present problems whose resolution is not specifically ad-
dressed in this discussion. 0 It is clear, however, that the burdens will
be unnecessarily compounded if transborder transfers of data identify-
ing other corporations are treated analogously to individually identifi-
able data.
The German Act goes even further by legislating mandatory tech-
nical security requirements during data transmissions. Reasoning that
66 Id. § 1 . Section 11 provides, in pertinent part:
If there is reason to believe that personal information will be used for ADP abroad the
information may be issued only after permission by the Data Inspection Board. Such per-
mission may be given only if there is ground to believe that the issuance will not cause
undue encroachment on privacy ....
67 Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection or Non-targ
Trade Barriers?, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1056, 1072 (1978).
68 Id. at 1072 n.88.
69 For several examples attesting to the importance of control over information flows, see id
at 1072-73.
70 One interim solution that has been suggested is to provide data protection that is "func-
tionally equivalent" to the standards mandated by a given European country through contractu-
ally established obligations on the part of a multinational corporation wishing to remove data
from the country. See Note, supra note 17, at 175. This proposal represents little more than a
"legal" method of complying with burdensome restrictions, while sidestepping much more im-
portant questions of law. The United States government should frame its data protection policy
with an intent to reduce such burdensome international trade practices.
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the data are still within German jurisdiction7' during the moment they
are being transferred out of Germany, the act requires the transmitting
party to guarantee that access to or alteration of the data by a third
party will be impossible during transmission. The requirement may
well lead to end-to-end encryption of all data transfers.7 2 If the recipi-
ent country has imposed different standards, even more significant
problems may be created. For example, the British Post Office (BPO)
forbids encrypted data transmissions from entering Britain if the BPO
is not supplied with the encryption key.7 3 However, by providing the
encryption key, the transmitting party violates the German security re-
quirement. Thus, data transfers that satisfy the German standard vio-
late the British standard, and vice versa.
71 Unauthorized access during transmission is a problem that is distinct from questions of
right to privacy. The distinction has been delineated in Gotlieb & Katz, supra note 52, at 7.
72 West German Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 6(1) and Annex to § 6(1). Section 6(1)
states:
Persons processing personal data and referred to in Section 1(2) or acting on behalf of
the persons or establishments referred to therein shall take the technical and organizational
measures necessary to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this Act, and in partic-
ular the requirements set out in the Annex to this Act. Measures shall be required only if the
cost involved is reasonable in relation to the desired level of protection.
The Annex to Section 6(1) includes more specific provisions:
Where personal data are processed automatically, appropriate measures suited to the
type of personal data to be protected shall be taken to ensure observance of the provisions of
this Act:
1) Unauthorized persons shall be refused admission to data processing facilities which pro-
cess personal data (admission control);
2) Persons employed in the processing of personal data shall be prevented from removing
storage media without authorization (leakage control);
3) Unauthorized input into the memory and the unauthorized examination, modification or
erasure of stored personal data shall be prevented (memory control);
4) The use by unauthorized persons of data processing systems from which or into which
personal data are transmitted by means of automatic equipment shall be prevented (user
control);
5) It shall be ensured that persons entitled to use a data processing system have access by
means of automatic equipment only to the personal data to which they have a right of access
(access control);
6) It shall be ensured that it is possible to check and to establish to which establishments
personal data can be communicated by means of automatic equipment (communication
control);
7) It shall be ensured that it is possible to check and establish what personal data have been
input into data processing systems, by whom and at what time (input control);
8) It shall be ensured that personal data which are processed on behalf of third parties are
processed strictly in accordance with the instructions of the principal (control of processing
on behalf of third parties);
9) It shall be ensured that data cannot be read, modified or erased without authorization
during their communication or during the transport of relevant storage media (transport
control);
10) It shall be ensured that the internal organization of authorities or enterprises is suited to
the particular requirements of data protection (organization control).
73 See generally Gotlieb & Katz, supra note 52, at 7 (domiciliary law mandating no secondary
use of data without prior consent would be breached if foreign country allows unfettered access,
even if no actual infringement of privacy occurred).
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The French Data Act of 1978, 74 taking another tack, attempts to
address behavioral issues that are seemingly unrelated to privacy. Al-
though the French act shares many regulatory characteristics with the
Swedish and German acts, it additionally prohibits any evaluation of
human conduct based solely on information retrieved from an auto-
mated data base.75 For criminal penalties to take effect, personal free-
doms need not even be infringed, as long as some decision was based
solely upon data utilizing automated technology. At least in France, it
seems, this "beginning of legislation on social profiles" represents
more an attack on automationper se than it does an enhancement of
personal privacy protection.76
Although early European data protection legislation, including
the three acts above described, focused exclusively on data that identi-
fied individuals, the most recent statutes have adopted corporate pri-
vacy provisions which include juristic persons (corporations, nonprofit
institutions, etc.) as well. In Austria,77 Denmark,78 and Norway,79 the
recently passed data protection statutes, if read literally, require corpo-
rations to obtain licenses for all data bases that they maintain about
each other, and to allow competitors the right to inspect them. The
laws seemingly extend the inspection rights to include even corporate
administrative files containing confidential commercial information. 0
This represents a significant departure from the already controversial
74 French Data Processing Act, supra note 3.
75 Id. art. 2. The statute states that:
No court decision resulting in a judgment on human behavior may use as its basis
automatically processed data which outline the profile or the personality of the person con-
cerned.
No administrative or private decision resulting in a judgment on human behavior may
use as its basis automatically processed data which outline the profile or the personality of
the person concerned.
76 Statement of Louis Joinet, French Ministry of Justice, in Focus on France, TRANSNAT'L
DATA REP., Mar. 1978, at 3.
77 Austrian Data Protection Act, supra note 3, art. 2, part. 1, § 3(2).
Part 1, section 3(2) of Article 2 provides: "Persons affected: natural or legal persons or associa-
tions of persons under commercial law, about whom data are collected, processed or disclosed."
78 Danish Private Registers Act and Danish Public Registers Act, supra note 3, part. 1. Part
I, section 1.-(l) of the Private Registers Act provides:
Registration comprising personal data where electronic data processing is used and system-
atic registration comprising private or financial data on any individual, institution, associa-
tion or business enterprise or other data on any personal matter that may reasonably be
demanded to be withheld from members of the general public, shall be permitted only sub-
ject to the provisions of Parts 1 and 2 of the Act.
79 Norwegian Privacy Act 197S, supra note 3, § 1. Section 1, in pertinent part, provides:
The Act is applicable to personal data registers and to other facilities whereby personal
information is utilized in certain types of activities.
The term "personal information" shall mean information and assessments which are,
directly or indirectly, traceable to identifiable individuals, associations or foundations.
80 See McGuire, supra note 46, at 4-6.
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role of the data inspection board with respect to individual data. Any
semblance of an attempt to protect individual privacy vanishes and is
replaced by a governmental mandate to forage among private corpo-
rate data bases under the rubric of protecting other corporations' pri-
vacy. However, this is not privacy protection, but rather a heavy-
handed form of commercial regulation.
In contrast, legislation in the United States has distinguished be-
tween individual and corporate privacy and has been limited to the
former. The United States legislation covers specific sectors where in-
dividual rights are perceived to need protection rather than including
the entire information processing industry. United States privacy stat-
utes rely heavily on the judicially self-enforcing mechanism of private
actions. Unlike the European laws, emphasis is given to the protection
of individual rights rather than to the regulation of data and data prac-
tices as such. Thus, the European laws frequently distinguish between
automated and non-automated data bases, while United States law
typically applies to all systems of records. Due to the narrow
sectorized approach to privacy legislation in the United States, an-
ticompetitive corporate privacy provisions have not been enacted.
The most extensive United States privacy protection statute cov-
ers public sector data. The Privacy Act of 19741 limits disclosures
from government data bases to previously published routine uses, and
to the individuals identified.8" Rights of access and correction are en-
forced through administrative appeals to the federal agency control-
ling the data and through the federal judiciary. A similar limitation in
Canada extends privacy protection only when federal data systems are
involved. 3
In the United States, disclosures of specific classes of government
records are expressly restricted by law. Of these, census and health
81 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
82 In addition, the Federal Register annually publishes notices of all systems of records main-
tained by United States government agencies. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 84,401 (Dec. 22, 1980), for
part of the 1980 annual publication of Privacy Act systems of records within the Department of
Health and Human Services. The notices include the following information: system name; se-
curity classification; system location; individuals covered by the system; categories of records
stored; authority for maintenance of the system; purpose; routine users of the records; policies
and practices for storing, retrieving, accessing, retaining, and disposing of records; safeguards of
the system; system manager's name and address; notification procedures; record access proce-
dures; contesting record procedures; record source categories; and exemptions from certain provi-
sions of the Privacy Act.
83 Canadian Human Rights Act, ch. 33, Pt. IV, 1976-77 Can. Stat. 913, 914 (1976). Applica-
tion 50 of Part IV states: "This Part applies to all federal information banks." "Federal informa-
tion bank" is defined as "a store of records within the control of a government institution where
any of the records comprised therein are used for administrative purposes." Id.
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data are most stringently controlled.8 4 At the National Center for
Health Statistics, for example, any disclosure of personally identifiable
data is specifically limited to the purpose for which they were col-
lected, and may not be released under any circumstances without the
identified individual's consent.85
However, in the private sector, United States legislation against
abuse and disclosure of personal data is far narrower than in the Euro-
pean statutes. The principal legislation regulating these data practices
is the Fair Credit Reporting Act.86 This act grew out of abuse of credit
records in the 1960s. It mandates accurate reporting of credit data, the
right of access to credit records, and correction of inaccurate informa-
tion. Remedies are provided through a private cause of action rather
than a central enforcement agency.
There is little argument that one problem with the American ap-
proach is that it leaves gaps in the breadth of protection afforded. The
shortcomings are not, however, due as much to difficulties in targeting
legislation at a given sector (which, for example, was quite successfully
accomplished with the Fair Credit Reporting Act), as they are to the
complete absence of legislation in other sectors, such as medical
records.87 Thus, the overall scope of United States statutory protection
is too narrow, although existing legislation may cover specific areas
comprehensively. The United States has recognized the corporate/in-
dividual dichotomy, but by failing adequately to protect domestic indi-
84 13 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1976). Section 8, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) The Secretary may, upon a written request, and in his discretion, furnish to Gover-
nors of States and Territories, courts of record, and individuals, data for genealogical and
other proper purposes, from the population, agriculture, and housing schedules prepared
under the authority of subchapter II of chapter 5 ....
Section 9, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Com-
merce or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of this title-
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose
other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment
or individual under this title can be identified; or
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or
bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
85 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 242m(d) (1976). Section 242m(d) (section 308(d) of
the Public Health Service Act) provides, in pertinent part:
No information obtained. . . [under the authorities of the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics] may be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was supplied unless
authorized under Regulations of the Secretary. . .. [S]uch information may not be pub-
lished or released in other form if the particular establishment or person supplying the infor-
mation or described in it is identifiable unless such establishment or person has consented
. . . to its publication or release in other form ....
86 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a et seq. (1976).
87 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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vidual interests, has made itself vulnerable to protective foreign laws
that unnecessarily burden commerce.
Soon after the passage of the Privacy Act, the Privacy Protection
Study Commission was created to study the data privacy situation in
the private sector and to make suggestions for legislation. The Com-
mission recommended legislation in numerous areas where protection
of individual privacy was nonexistent.8 8 Despite recent congressional
interest, these proposals have yet to be enacted into law. 9 Congres-
sional inaction has international ramifications beyond the immediate
domestic need for statutory protection. If other nations perceive a lack
of United States commitment to further legislation, they may well re-
spond by expanding further their own domestic restrictions on data
flows to achieve the protection they desire.90 Although it is still un-
clear which ultimate direction the 97th Congress will choose, United
States economic interests abroad will be better served if Congress, fol-
lowing the philosophy of the existing United States privacy laws, en-
acts additional individual privacy protection, rather than if it
continues to follow a path of inaction. Such legislation, if enacted,
would maintain the dichotomy between individual and corporate pri-
vacy. No provisions for enforcing a corporate privacy right would be
included, and a private cause of action would be created only in spe-
cific sectors. The proposal to protect the confidentiality of medical
records, discussed above, is a good example of one sector where legis-
lative action is appropriate. Although the American and European
methodologies would continue to diverge, the United States would
move closer to the European level of substantive individual protection.
The current absence of a United States statute implementing a corpo-
rate right of privacy reflects a widespread concern with imposing an
unjustifiable economic burden on commerce in the name of privacy
protection.9' This burden can be further minimized by fully protecting
88 Privacy Protection Study Commission, supra note 36.
89 H.R. 5935 & S. 503,96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H 11012, S1934 (1979) (medical
records); H.R. 3409 & S.867, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1929, S3874 (1979) (re-
search records). These bills addressed problems of confidentiality in medical records and in
records gathered in the process of research. Provisions of the bills included rights to access and
limitations on disclosure.
90 For details, see supra notes 3, 66-70, and accompanying text.
91 Congress opted to postpone more extensive regulation of individual privacy rights in the
private sector until the impact of such legislation could be analyzed. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916, 6934-36. It thus seems




individual privacy interests in the United States in an effort to allay
European concerns.
The United States interest in protecting personal privacy and ex-
panding international trade in information markets conflicts sharply
with existing European data protection laws. The lead position of
United States exporters of information technology is already
threatened. It will erode further if the various federal agencies in-
volved in international telecommunications and trade policy are not
coordinated by a lead agency. United States participation in current
international discussions on international data flow is of limited value
if it is not actively supported by the present administration at home, as
well as abroad. As an example of the extent to which the international
situation could deteriorate, consider for a moment several options that
have been suggested over the past decade in Canada, the United States
closest trade partner.92 The proposals materialized from concerns over
the inadequacy of individual privacy protection in the United States.
They share the intellectual seed from which the European corporate
privacy concept has sprouted.
First, it was proposed that all organizations storing data on Cana-
dian citizens in data banks outside the country be required to register
with the Canadian government.93 This approach, however, would
erect no barriers to the actual flow of data, and thus do nothing to
lessen the risk of abuses perpetrated in private, foreign data banks.
Moreover, the proposal would increase the risk of governmental abuse
of personal data since it would provide centralized access to the store-
houses of such information.
94
A second, more radical proposal, was to prohibit all foreign stor-
age of personal data identifying Canadian citizens. 95 Such an outright
ban would not only impose intolerable restraints on the freedom of
expression, but also would present unsolvable enforcement problems.
A third suggested solution was to create a domestic "library" consist-
ing of duplicates of all personal data files transported out of Canada.96
This would be prohibitively expensive, and, in any case, would fail to
92 Many of the approaches have been directly addressed in Canada over the past decade. See
COMPUTER/COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: A POSITION STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CA-
NADA 17 (1973); Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, supra note 40.
93 Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, supra note 40, at 24.
94 Gotlieb, Dalfen, and Katz argue that the national register raises serious public policy ques-
tions regarding the limits to be imposed on the intrusive powers of government, whether or not
exercised in the name of protecting its citizens. The personal register would be yet another data
bank that would require protective measures to prevent its abuse. Id.
95 Id. at 25.
96 Id.
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achieve the presumed objective of regulating the type of information
transferred.
In addition, it has been suggested that Canada might require for-
eign corporations to restructure their Canadian branches into in-
dependent Canadian subsidiaries, thus forcing all personal data bases
to be under the control of the "domesticated" company.97 Even disre-
garding the myriad business-related difficulties such a law would cre-
ate, independent subsidiaries would probably still find ways to
circumvent the restriction.
Several of these proposals-notably the "library" approach and
corporate restructuring-suggest the potential for an emergent corpo-
rate privacy statute in Canada. At the very least, these two proposals,
by failing specifically to address the difficulties arising from individu-
ally identifiable data, evidence a continuing confusion of individual
and corporate privacy which might have been avoided by more exten-
sive United States privacy laws. Although several of the suggested ap-
proaches would not even accomplish their purpose of retaining control
over information exported from Canada, it is clear that any one of
them could severely disrupt Canadian-American trade.98
For the United States, the importance of directing international
attention to the transborder data flow problem is motivated by, inter
alia, the commercial need for consistency in national laws. It is evi-
dent that international trade in data and data processing services may
be severely handicapped if subjected to a panoply of national laws that
are overly restrictive of data transfers. Minimizing overbroad privacy
laws that can act as non-tariff trade barriers, thus, must be a high pri-
ority in United States participation in trade negotiations.99 Data pro-
tection laws, whether corporate- or individual-oriented, create non-
tariff trade barriers. Arguably the burden that accompanies corporate
provisions differs only as a matter of degree from that accompanying
individual provisions. The key distinction between the two interests,
however, does not lie in the extent of the burdens generated. Corpo-
rate data laws are not aimed at protecting individual privacy interests,
97 Id.
98 Determining in advance exactly what the impact would be is not feasible due to the exten-
sive interdependence of various sectors of the Canadian and American economies. Most impor-
tantly, the flow of information is usually tied to the flow of goods and services, and it is inevitable
that restrictions on one would adversely affect the other.
99 Kirby, Developing International Rules to Protect Privacy, 12 LAW & COMPUTER TECH. 53,
56 (1979). International agreements may also delay the current trend toward taxing data trans-
fers by the number of "bits" of data transmitted rather than the number of telephone lines leased.
Id. at 57. A "bit" is technical terminology for a binary digit, i.e., the numbers zero or one in base
two. This is the almost universal numbering system of automated data processing systems.
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and therefore cannot be justified on that basis. Instead, corporate pri-
vacy laws serve as a means of regulating commerce between corpora-
tions and governments. Once this difference between corporate and
individual provisions is recognized, the additional burden that accom-
panies corporate provisions becomes unjustifiable. Eliminating corpo-
rate provisions will be a major step toward minimizing the trade
barriers generated by data protection laws.
For the countries that have enacted data protection legislation
protecting individuals, an international solution is both necessary and
appropriate. 100 The limited power of domestic privacy laws over ex-
tra-jurisdictionally stored data has caused some countries to turn to
international law to try to impress stronger privacy protection on other
nations. 1 1 An even greater impetus is the apprehension that in some
jurisdictions no privacy laws at all will be enacted, creating "data
havens" where personal information is stored to circumvent more
stringent national laws elsewhere.1
02
International agreement holds the greatest promise of all potential
methods for the eventual resolution of the data protection problems. 103
In negotiating such an agreement, corporate privacy provisions should
be treated as a purely economic issue, that is, they should be treated as
being only as justifiable as an opposing tariff. With respect to individ-
ual-oriented data protection laws, uniformity of data handling prac-
tices must ultimately be achieved for unrestricted trade in data and
data processing services.
Strong United States initiatives are responsible, in part, for the
focus of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) Guidelines on Individual Privacy. The agreement,
signed by sixteen of twenty-four OECD members in September,
100 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
101 See Gotlieb & Katz, supra note 52, at 2.
102 -d. at 3. The argument has more recently been leveled at the United States for advocating
less protectionist privacy laws than certain European countries. See Emmett, New TDF Concerns
Surface, DATAMATION, Feb. 1981, at 48. The suggestion that, from a human rights perspective,
the policies of United States "data haven" are morally bankrupt for not protecting the privacy of
its residents has more propaganda than substantive value when viewed in light of existing United
States privacy legislation.
103 An examination of existing private international remedies suggests that they are an inade-
quate international solution. Traditionally, the primary barrier against bringing an international
action in tort has been the absence of common law privacy protection. Even in countries such as
the United States where constitutional law provides limited common law privacy protection, ac-
tions brought in extra-jurisdictional breaches would be defeated if brought outside of the United
States. Gotlieb & Katz, supra note 52, at 13 n.16. Although the private international remedy
may receive more favorable judicial treatment in the future, the inconsistency of domestic laws
has made it evident that a broader approach is needed.
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1980,14 suggests voluntary guidelines for national legislation rather
than a binding international convention." 5 Due both to the rapidly
developing technology and to the fact that many nations have yet to
enact any privacy legislation, a binding convention would probably
have been premature. Voluntary guidelines identify privacy as a pri-
ority area where agreement is desirable, if not yet imminent. It is to be
expected that those nations most enthusiastically supporting data flow
restrictions will respond with much more zealous enforcement than the
United States. Such is the flexibility-and inherent limitation--of
nonbinding agreements that focus on precepts rather than
implementation.
The cardinal principle of the guidelines is the individual's right to
have access to any stored information that identifies him or her. As
Justice M.D. Kirby,10 6 coordinator of the OECD effort, stated during
the negotiations, "If nothing else is achieved in domestic privacy pro-
tection and in international efforts to protect privacy in transborder
data flows, then agreement about this right of access will be a most
significant legal development."'
10 7
As agreed upon, the OECD Guidelines contain eight basic princi-
ples that may be summarized as follows. First, data collection should
be limited to necessary information that is obtained by lawful and fair
means. Where appropriate, the consent of the data subject should be
obtained. Second, personal data should be accurate, complete, cur-
rent, and relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used.
Third, the intended uses of the data are to be specified at the time they
are collected. Fourth, any disclosures of the data must either be com-
patible with the purposes for which they were collected or be author-
ized by law. Fifth, reasonable security safeguards should be taken
against loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or
disclosure of data. Six, no secret data should exist. A general policy of
openness should be encouraged regarding the existence and the nature
of all personal data held by data controllers. Seventh, data subjects
should have the right to obtain data about themselves within a reason-
104 Emmett, supra note 102, at 48. Recommendation of the Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80) 58 (Oct. 1, 1980). At the September 23,
1980, meeting where the recommendations were adopted, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom abstained. See Emmett, supra note 102, at 48.
105 A detailed analysis of the guidelines may be found at 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 241 (1981).
106 Chairman, OECD Expert Group on Transborder Data Barriers and the Protection of
Privacy.
107 Kirby, supra note 99, at 59.
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able time and in intelligible form, and to challenge the accuracy and
the relevance thereof. They should have the right to have inaccurate
or irrelevant data erased, completed or modified, as is appropriate. Fi-
nally, for every data collection, a data controller should be accounta-
ble for compliance with the above principles. 108
The guidelines recommend that each country act to limit the
amount and method of data collected, and to assure data integrity. 0 9
Furthermore, when primary data are collected, respondents should be
informed of the purpose for which the data will be used. Under the
guidelines, disclosure for other purposes is only allowed if either the
identified individual assents or judicial authorization is obtained. Fi-
nally, the guidelines provide that all data systems have one person des-
ignated accountable for ensuring that individual rights are
protected."10
The OECD Guidelines on Individual Privacy are laudable for the
progress, however modest, that they have made in establishing at least
a modicum of international accord on this highly politicized issue.
Never before have this many countries agreed, even as to general prin-
ciples, about data protection.' 1 ' One positive by-product of the agree-
ment is that its structure helps to focus attention on the differences
between individual and corporate privacy interests. Moreover, the
guidelines, by addressing only individual privacy issues, avoid the pit-
fall of consolidating questions of individual versus corporate privacy
into one document.
Unfortunately, the guidelines may be more notable for what they
do not accomplish. For the subscribing OECD countries, it is doubtful
that concerns regarding inadequate United States privacy protection
will be assuaged by guidelines that include no specific procedures for
compliance and implementation by each national government. From
the United States perspective, concern exists that some European
countries will utilize the guidelines to justify stengthening already
stringent data protection laws." 2 Future progress will depend to a
great degree upon the positions taken by the countries that are still
considering legislation. A primary difficulty is that the guidelines will
do little more than create a superficial appearance of similarity. Ulti-
108 Emmett, supra note 102, at 48.
109 Data integrity as an issue is distinguished from the right to examine and correct data be-
cause it places a duty on the data processor to ensure that he is storing accurate data in the first
place. For further delineation of these issues, see supra note 12.
110 Kirby, supra note 99, at 60.
111 See, ag., The Council of Europe's experience in 1971, discussed supra in note 27.
112 Emmett, supra note 102, at 48.
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mately, in five to ten years, a more specific document, perhaps a bind-
ing convention, is inevitable.' 13 This document should resolve
questions of inconsistent implementation strategies by different coun-
tries, limit data restrictions to the spheres of data where privacy abuse
presents the greatest risk, and achieve reciprocal recognition of indi-
vidual remedies when data is inappropriately disclosed. It is too early
now to ascertain to what extent the OECD Guidelines will pave the
way for a future agreement on individual privacy.
However, in the wake of ratification of the OECD Guidelines, re-
ports are reaching the press of a move toward creating a parallel agree-
ment recognizing a corporate privacy interest.11 4 Any international
agreement legitimizing corporate privacy legislation would be nothing
less than a resounding setback for international free trade. But as the
growing amount of national legislation indicates, the issue will not
simply disappear if the United States fails to address it. The individ-
ual/corporate dichotomy must be brought to the attention of Euro-
pean countries considering enactment of corporate privacy statutes.
Effective negotiations by the United States now may limit the repeti-
tion for corporate interests of the controversial and growing number of
individual-oriented data protection laws and the non-tariff trade barri-
ers they impose. If there was ever a critical time for a unified United
States position on transborder data flow issues, it is now.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the corporate privacy interest cannot be justified as a pro-
tection of individual or of corporate interests. It is a form of regulating
commerce that imposes a heavy burden on free trade. The United
States has recognized the distinction between corporate and individual
privacy interests, but has failed adequately to protect individual inter-
ests. Foreign countries have perceived a threat to the privacy interests
of their nationals in the transmission of identifiable data to countries
where they have concluded that the confidentiality of data is inade-
quately safeguarded. They have responded by enacting data protec-
tion laws that restrict trade as well. The individual privacy interest is
113 See the currently proposed Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, openedfor signature Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108,
which has been adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, but not yet
ratified by all of its members. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INFORMATION BULLETIN ON LE-
GAL ACTIVITIES, No. 4, at 15 (July 1979); Evans, Computers and Privacy: The New Council of




more justifiable than the corporate interest, but it, too, involves signifi-
cant commercial issues.
Although the full impact of the European data protection laws-
both individual and corporate-has not yet been felt by the United
States," 5 their initial repercussions are noticeable." 6 It is imperative
that a coherent American information policy address the various
problems in international data flow, particularly corporate privacy.
Although concern for these issues exists, for example, within the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration and the
Department of Justice,' '7 the continued failure both to agree upon
objectives" 8 and to unify the voices of the various federal agencies1 19
will only allow the unfettered expansion of restrictive corporate pri-
vacy statutes, and the further eclipse of American economic interests.
Although the OECD Guidelines on Individual Privacy are a be-
ginning in this regard, the United States should continue to support
OECD efforts aimed at harmonizing conflicting laws. The prevention
of international corporate privacy guidelines must be high on the na-
tional agenda of the United States. At the least, short term goals
should include aggressive government support of United States busi-
ness in negotiating bilateral solutions with those countries that have
already enacted data protection laws.
The United States can be particularly influential in the developing
countries. These countries must be shown that a workable balance can
exist among the competing interests of individual privacy protection,
the free flow of information endangered by corporate privacy statutes,
and their own continued domestic economic and technological devel-
opment. 20 The American position on transborder data flows and pri-
vacy must be an outgrowth of a well-defined domestic information
policy. It is hoped that the failure of several recent privacy bills in the
Congress 121 does not presage future congressional inaction in this area,
115 See, eg., W. Michael Blumenthal, Remarks to the National Computer Conference (May 6,
1981) reprinted in 47 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 550, 552 (1981).
116 Emmett, supra note 102, at 48.
117 See, eg., NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNrrED STATES INFORMATION POLICY 17 (1980).
118 See, e.g., Eger, sufpra note 67.
119 Such unifying legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 1957,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), would establish an interagency Council on International Communi-
cations and Information.
120 A good outline of issues relevant to national development can be found in Committee on
Computers and Public Policy, Association for Computing Machinery, .4 Problem-List of Issues
Concerning Computers andPublic Policy, 17 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 495, 502 (1974).
121 See supra note 89.
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and that executive leadership will unify the numerous internal voices
into a single chorus. Only at that time will United States efforts to
prevent further proliferation of laws restricting transborder transfers of
corporate data have any significant prospect of success.
